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Action from activists is at the origin of many initiatives that end up injecting moral concerns into the 
way companies operate. In such instances, activists function as moral entrepreneurs that lastingly 
change the definition of what constitutes morally acceptable corporate behavior. Yet, in order to 
have such a lasting effect on companies, activist efforts need to pass through multiple stages that 
deal with both the effective mobilization of their own constituents and the triggering of corporate 
responses that can induce broader change in the economy. In the present article, we study how local 
shareholder activists initiated and helped sustain the process that led to the establishment of active 
ownership in Switzerland between 1997 and 2011. Active ownership refers to the active 
engagement of shareholders with firms to push them towards considering environmental, social, 
and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in their decision-making. The case illustrates the processual 
nature of moralizing dynamics initiated by activists and emphasizes the long-term and cumulative 
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Over the past decades, economic actors have become increasingly exposed to demands from 
civil society to incorporate moral considerations into their actions (Balsiger, 2016; Mena & Palazzo, 
2012). Traditionally grounded in a financial logic of profit making, firms today are asked to also 
explicitly take into account the general public good, for instance by helping vulnerable portions of 
society (Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014), protecting the environment (Gond, Barin Cruz, Raufflet, & 
Charron, 2016), screening investments for corruption-related risks (Shymko & Roulet, 2017) or 
generally engaging in socially responsible activities (Hafenbrädl & Waeger, 2017).  
This evolution has led academics to research the conditions under which companies are more 
likely to become moralized. Scholars of social movements have been particularly prolific in this task 
(Arjaliès, 2010; Daudigeos, Roulet, & Valiorgue, 2018; Georgallis, 2017). Traditionally 
specialized in investigating the nation state as the target of activists, movement scholars have 
become increasingly interested in what some have called the “private politics” of firm-activist 
interactions (Soule, 2012). Here, the focus is on the analysis of how movement challengers act as 
‘moral entrepreneurs’ who infuse the incumbent economic system with more explicit or different 
moral content (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). This social movement scholarship on private politics can be 
broadly divided into two sub-categories.  
In the first sub-category, researchers focus squarely on the moral entrepreneurs and study 
questions related to how activists are able to mobilize adequate resources and support from allies. 
For effective mobilization to occur, scholars have emphasized the importance of free spaces – spaces 
shielded from the power of incumbents (Kellogg, 2009; Massa, 2017), the existence of a critical mass 
of committed core supporters (Kaplan, 2008; Massa, Helms, Voronov, & Wang, 2017) and the 
reaching out to more distant friends and allies in order to attain scale and power (Zajak, 2017). 
In the second sub-category, the focus is not on the moral entrepreneurs themselves, but on the 
firms that these entrepreneurs are mobilizing against (Weber & Waeger, 2017). Scholars active in 
this sub-category have investigated which types of companies are particularly likely to get targeted 
by activists (King & Carberry, 2017), how companies react to being targeted (Briscoe, Chin, & 
Hambrick, 2014) and how the reaction of targeted companies triggers related reactions at non-
targeted companies and the wider economy (Mena & Waeger, 2014).  
In the present article, we draw on these advancements in the field and integrate them 
theoretically. Much of the existing literature singles out individual factors – such as mobilizing 
supporters or targeting certain types of companies – that play a role in how activists spur the 
ultimate moralization of companies. We adopt a unifying perspective that investigates how such 
individual factors can be seen as pieces contributing to a larger process. To do so, we draw on the 
literature of the sociology of morality. Rather than conceiving of moral behavior as a universal 
standard, we see markets as the site of ongoing struggles around definitions of what constitutes 
right or wrong (i.e. moral) corporate behavior (Fourcade & Healy, 2007; Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). What 
the present study illustrates is that individual factors in a moralizing process are not independent 
from each other. Rather, they occur sequentially, build on each other and can jointly create a 
dynamic that leads to the moralization of the economy.  
This integrative perspective is inspired by a historical case study of how active ownership on 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues (thereafter ‘active ownership’) has become 
institutionalized in Switzerland. Active ownership refers to the active engagement of universal 
owners with the management of firms to push these firms towards taking into account ESG-criteria 
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in their decision-making (Dimson, Karakaş, & Li, 2015). Universal owners – such as many pension 
funds – are major institutional investors who have very diversified and long-term holdings. As they 
co-own the entire market through these holdings, their portfolios are exposed to risks related to 
negative corporate externalities, and universal investors thus have an interest to minimize these 
negative externalities. Consequently, many pension funds and other universal owners have tried to 
establish themselves as interlocutors of firms and to influence their management with respect to 
ESG-issues. In Switzerland, however, the boards of directors have historically been keen on keeping 
control over high-level strategic decisions1, such as the ones related to ESG-issues, and they have 
attempted at resisting pension funds’ push towards more voice on these issues. We study the 
historical emergence and ultimate institutionalization of active ownership in the Swiss context.  
The theoretical notion that emerges from the examination of this case is not that a single factor 
related to activist mobilization or to the characteristics of corporate targets can explain how 
companies become moralized. Rather, moralization through activists is both a political and a long-
term process with different stages that cumulatively build on each other and that contain both 
elements of mobilization and direct and indirect reactions from corporate targets to such 
mobilization (see Figure 1 below). It is more, while the case illustrates that a variety of factors are 
important to explain how companies – and ultimately the wider economy – are moralized, none of 
these factors emerges as more important than others. Rather, the case indicates the processual 
nature of moralization and thus implies that each individual factor is insufficient to explain 
moralization on its own.  
 
 
We draw on written documents from shareholder activists as well as newspaper coverage 
regarding the emergence of active ownership in Switzerland. We follow the path of Ethos, an 
investment foundation for Swiss pension funds set up in Geneva in 1997, which ultimately 
succeeded in establishing active ownership in Switzerland. We analyzed 684 pages of publicly 
accessible documents Ethos published between 1997 (its creation) and the end of 2011 (when it had 
firmly established active ownership in Switzerland). In addition, we consulted all 302 newspaper 
                                                             
1 Contrary to other European countries, in which the role of the board is restricted to monitoring, the board of 
directors in Switzerland is also the ultimate decision-making body regarding the general strategic orientation 
of firms (Hoppmann, Naegele, & Girod, 2018) 
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articles in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (the newspaper of record in the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland) and in Le Temps2 (the newspaper of record in the French-speaking part of Switzerland) 
that covered Ethos or Dominique Biedermann (Ethos’ director) during this time period. These 
sources allowed us to establish a clear timeline of critical events and stages. We then consulted 
press articles from additional newspapers or weekly magazines regarding the coverage of what 
emerged as particularly critical events in Ethos’ history.  
We now turn to an in-depth account of each one of the stages through which active ownership 
in Switzerland evolved.  
 
CASE FINDINGS 
Stage 1: Creating a free space for mobilization 
Until the 1980s, the shareholder structure of Swiss companies was almost exclusively composed 
of individual investors. From the mid-1980s onwards, this shareholder structure started to change as 
institutional investors – Swiss pension funds at first – became progressively more important. 
Traditionally mostly invested in real estate and Swiss government bonds, the bursting of a real 
estate bubble at the beginning of the 1990s, together with an already ageing population put 
pressure on Swiss pension funds to seek greater returns in thus far underinvested asset classes. As a 
consequence, most pension funds started investing in the stock market with its potential for greater 
returns.  
A no-brainer from a financial point of view – the Swiss Market Index, the Swiss blue chips index, 
grew fivefold between 1988 (when it was created) and 2000 –, investing in the stock market 
nevertheless elicited resistance due to moral concerns at some pension funds. At Swiss pension 
funds, the representatives of the employer and the representatives of the employees each detain 
50% of the voting rights when it comes to deciding how to invest the money of the pension fund 
(Amman & Zingg, 2010). This led to considerable difficulty in moving the Caisse de prévoyance du 
personnel enseignant de l’instruction publique et des fonctionnaires de l’administration du canton de 
Genève (CIA)3, the largest of the public pension funds of the canton4 of Geneva and one of the 
largest in Switzerland, to invest part of their assets in the stock market. Indeed, the CIA was at the 
beginning of the 1990s among the pension funds with the highest proportion of unionized employee 
representatives. Swiss trade unions are traditionally skeptical of capitalism and its financial 
instruments. Hence, the CIA’s employee representatives were not going to support the decision to 
buy shares of listed companies, since they saw these companies as powerful entities uninterested in 
the wellbeing of society in general and of workers in particular.  
The fact that the CIA nevertheless ended up investing in the stock market is to a great extent 
attributed to Dominique Biedermann. Biedermann had completed a PhD in economics at the 
University of Geneva in 1989 and joined the CIA in 1991 as the deputy director responsible of the 
CIA’s financial division and in 1994, he became director of the CIA. As an economist, he saw the turn 
towards investing in the stock market as inevitable if the CIA did not want to reduce the benefits it 
could provide to its retired members. But Biedermann was also uniquely positioned to understand 
and appreciate the social concerns of the employee representatives in the pension fund. A practicing 
                                                             
2 Le Temps was called Journal de Genève until March 1, 1998. 
3 The CIA merged with another public pension fund to create a new pension fund called Caisse de prévoyance 
de l’Etat de Genève (CPEG) in 2013 
4 Switzerland is a federal republic composed of 26 cantons. Cantons are the equivalent to the states in the US. 
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Catholic, Biedermann often refers to Christian values as being at the basis of his actions and is 
outspoken in his defense of a conception of the economy that serves mankind, rather than the other 
way around.  
Biedermann looked for ways to alleviate some of the fears of the employee representatives 
within the CIA and the solution came in the form of a modified investment plan: First, the CIA would 
not invest in just any company in the stock market. Rather, it would create a portfolio of stocks from 
socially responsible firms. Second, the CIA planned to become an active investor and aimed for 
engaging in discussions with the management of Swiss firms on how these firms could improve their 
performance regarding environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues. With this plan 
of a socially responsible and active investment approach, Biedermann won over the employee 
representatives within the CIA, allowing him to send a call for tenders for the construction of an ESG 
investment portfolio to the asset management departments of all major Swiss banks in 1995. Only 
few of them responded, as there was at the time virtually no expertise within Swiss banks regarding 
the analysis of companies’ ESG-performance. In the end, a consortium of three players won the 
tender. The consortium consisted of Lombard Odier, a private bank that would provide the financial 
analysis, Sarasin, another private bank that would provide the environmental analysis and Centre 
Info, a think tank that would provide the social analysis for the stock selection.  
However, the involvement of three organizations and the inclusion of social and environmental 
selection criteria (on top of the traditional financial criteria) meant that the construction of the 
investment portfolio was going to be considerably more expensive than a conventional mandate. 
Already in financial difficulties, Biedermann at the CIA thus decided that it would be beneficial to 
create an entity for socially responsible investments (SRIs) not only for the CIA alone, but also for 
other pension funds interested in SRIs. This would allow for the management fees paid to the 
consortium to be spread across multiple pension funds. Rather than just creating a portfolio 
exclusively for the CIA, Biedermann thus contacted another Geneva-based pension fund, the Caisse 
paritaire de prévoyance du bâtiment (CPP), to together set up an investment foundation5 with the 
name Ethos in March 1997. Biedermann became the first president of Ethos, while retaining his 
position at the head of the CIA for another 18 months.  According to its charter, the explicit goals of 
Ethos are to “[p]romote sustainable development principles and corporate governance best 
practices in investment activities”  as well as to “[p]romote a stable and prosperous socio-economic 
environment that works for the benefit of civil society as a whole and safeguards the interests of 
future generations”.  
These goals translate into three pillars of activity. The first pillar involves its asset management 
services and Ethos offers investment funds for which it selects companies not only on the basis of 
financial, but also environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria. The second pillar of 
Ethos is the exercise of shareholder rights, and in particular voting rights, in the companies its 
members invest in. While exercising their voting rights at companies’ general assemblies has been 
quasi compulsory for pension funds in the United States for a long time (Davis & Thompson, 1994) 
pension funds in Switzerland had no obligation to do so until 2013 and thus remained largely passive 
(Corpataux, Crevoisier, & Theurillat, 2009). This inhibited the development of an infrastructure that 
would support pension funds in taking decisions regarding the way they could cast their vote – an 
obstacle Ethos was going to remove by creating a voting recommendation service for its pension 
funds. And the third pillar of Ethos is to engage in shareholder activist activities around ESG-issues 
                                                             
5 In Swiss law, investment foundations are investment vehicles conceived for the management of collective 
investments by Swiss pension funds Membership is restricted to Swiss pension funds. 
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and thus to actively encourage – and in case encouragement is not enough, to pressure – companies 
to improve their ESG-performance over time.  
The second and third pillars of Ethos’ activities were truly revolutionary at the time of Ethos’ 
creation and continue to be so today. No other Swiss financial organization was close to thinking 
about offering such activities at the time and no Swiss financial organization has been able to truly 
emulate Ethos ever since. The pension funds themselves were too small to provide voting 
recommendations or shareholder activist activities themselves. They were also too easily influenced 
and intimidated by firms to take the role of a critical shareholder. Ethos constitutes a separate entity 
– a free space – that shields pension funds from firms’ direct influence and intimidation tactics. And 
it is in this quality as a free space that lay Ethos’ potential to bundle the dispersed and latent power 
of Swiss pension funds. Hence, if it were to succeed in bundling pension funds’ latent power 
companies would find it more difficult to put pressure on individual funds because it would be the 
new entity – Ethos –, rather than individual funds, that would take a critical stance towards 
companies. 
 
Stage 2: Mobilize Core Allies 
The creation of Ethos was essential to set up a space insulated from corporate influence. 
However, Ethos was also very small and started with only two pension funds. In order to realize the 
potential that lay in this unique space, Ethos had to grow and attract additional pension funds to join 
the foundation. Only if Ethos could convince pension funds to join the foundation – and to pay for its 
services – would it be able to gain the scale and critical mass to become an actor with the ability to 
influence decisions at Swiss companies. While Ethos was from the very beginning active on all its 
three pillars, its limited size forced it at the outset to prioritize the development of the first two 
pillars (the establishment of SRI funds and the production of voting recommendations for the 
general assemblies of Swiss firms) over the third pillar (shareholder activism). 
In 1997, Ethos started with the establishment of an SRI fund of Swiss shares, which it quickly 
complemented with additional funds for shares from foreign firms and for corporate and 
government bonds. In September 1998, Dominique Biedermann left the CIA and became full-time 
director at Ethos. Being the former director of one of the largest pension funds in Switzerland, 
Biedermann had excellent contacts to other pension fund directors and used these to market Ethos’ 
new products. Biedermann’s efforts quickly bore fruits: created in March 1997 by only two pension 
funds, 6 months later already 20 pension funds had adhered to Ethos, which translated into 200 
million Swiss Francs under management; at the end of 1999 they were 74 members and 744 million 
Swiss Francs and at the end of 2000 86 members and 878 million Swiss Francs.  
 In parallel to the establishment of these first funds, Ethos also elaborated guidelines for the 
exercise of the voting rights at the general assemblies of the firms its funds invested in. On the basis 
of these guidelines, Ethos then provided voting recommendations to the pension funds that had 
invested in its funds. Swiss pension funds were traditionally very reluctant to actively use their 
voting rights. A combination of an anti-conflictual Swiss culture, the lack of pension fund resources 
to make informed decisions, a series of conflicts of interest and the absence of legal or normative 
constraints to vote led to a situation, in which pension funds either abstained or quasi-automatically 
voted in line with the propositions of the board of directors of the companies they held shares in. 
With the issuing of voting recommendations, Ethos aimed to change this situation and to remedy 
the lack of information pension funds had with respect to the items on the agenda at the general 
RUNNING HEADER: ACTIVISTS AS MORAL ENTREPRENEURS  
 
 7 
assemblies of Swiss firms. Ethos thus provided its pension fund members with extremely detailed 
recommendations regarding each item on the agenda of the general assemblies of Swiss companies.  
Having successfully established the first two pillars mentioned in its charter, Ethos managed to 
generate a sustainable revenue stream from its asset management and voting recommendation 
services. It also managed to establish close ties with its pension fund members. For instance, while 
at the beginning Ethos retroceded the voting rights for the general assemblies at Swiss firms to its 
pension fund members, from 1999 onwards the pension funds had enough confidence in Ethos’ 
position and abilities that they would allow the foundation to exercise these voting rights on their 
behalf. This marked a first step in Ethos becoming the nexus where the power of Swiss pension 
funds would bundle. This central position of Ethos is exemplified by the difference between the 
assets Ethos manages directly itself and the weight it represents at the general assemblies of Swiss 
firms. Hence, the assets that Ethos has directly under management only amount to approximately 
0.1% of the total market capitalization of the Swiss stock market. But because pension funds that are 
members of Ethos also possess stocks in Swiss companies outside of Ethos’ funds and because also 
non-members can cede their voting rights to Ethos, Ethos can quickly represent 20-30 times more 
votes than it directly manages in its funds. And this weight is further increased by the fact that the 
participation of shareholders at the general assemblies of Swiss companies lingers mostly around 
50%. In other words, if Ethos represents 2.5% of the capital at a general assembly with a 
participation rate of 50%, it represents already 5% of the votes at that general assembly. 
Both the revenues generated from its asset management and voting recommendation services 
and the ever-closer relationships between the Ethos leadership and its pension fund members were 
crucial for Ethos to further bolster its position and to become progressively more ambitious with 
respect to the third pillar mentioned in its charter – shareholder activism. For one, with the revenues 
Ethos generated it could invest in personnel that was able to follow the Swiss firms more closely and 
thus to get a better understanding of the ESG-issues these firms could improve on. And maybe more 
importantly, the close relationships Ethos had built with its pension fund members enabled 
Biedermann to motivate these pension funds to engage in more onerous shareholder activist 
activities. Since its creation, Ethos had engaged with Swiss companies regarding ESG-issues, but it 
did so in a reactive fashion: when ESG-issues surfaced at Swiss companies, Ethos would contact the 
management of these companies to address these issues. But increasingly, Ethos wanted to put 
forward its own agenda and to proactively push for the ESG-issues it deemed relevant. To gain this 
agenda-setting capacity, Ethos needed to actively mobilize its pension fund members. And the 
success Ethos would ultimately have in mobilizing this group of core allies for more assertive 
shareholder activist activities would mark a crucial step towards establishing the foundation as an 
independent and critical interlocutor of the Swiss corporate elite with respect to ESG-issues.  
Ethos developed two instruments to bundle the power of pension funds for its shareholder 
activist activities: The Ethos Engagement Pool (EEP) and shareholder resolutions. The EEP was 
founded in 2004. The EEP is a mandate by pension funds for Ethos to have a dialogue with Swiss 
companies around ESG-issues. During the annual meeting of the EEP, Ethos and the pension fund 
members determine which ESG-issues Ethos should push with the management of Swiss companies 
during the following year. The EEP is thus an instrument for Ethos to proactively set the agenda 
regarding the ESG-issues it wants to address. Started with only two members, it grew to more than 
50 members by 2011 and at the end of 2017 it had 133 members. What is interesting about the EEP 
is that it is one single contract between all the pension fund members and Ethos and thus channels 
the entire weight of these pension funds into the EEP. And while it is formally the pension fund 
members of the EEP that determine the issues Ethos should address with the companies, on a 
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practical level Ethos has much more knowledge about both the ESG-issues that have the most 
traction and that are most likely to resonate at the companies. Ethos thus exerts an important 
steering function with respect to the agenda-setting of the issues to be discussed with companies 
within the framework of the EEP. 
The second instrument are shareholder resolutions. Shareholder resolutions are proposals 
submitted by shareholders and to be voted on at a company’s general assembly. They are a very 
common instrument in the United States but much rarer in Switzerland. One reason is that 
submitting a shareholder resolution at a Swiss company is much more difficult and requires 
shareholders to detain a much higher percentage of a Swiss company’s total market capitalization 
resolution. For instance, to submit a shareholder resolution at Nestlé in 2005, it was necessary to 
detain Nestlé shares worth 265 million US dollars whereas to submit a resolution at a US company a 
shareholder only needs to detain shares worth 2000 US dollars. In other words, gaining the capacity 
to submit shareholder resolutions at Swiss firms was a very tall order for Ethos: Ethos does not own 
the shares invested in its funds. And even if it did, these funds would not be enough to clear the 
threshold to submit a resolution at most large Swiss firms6. The way Ethos managed to nevertheless 
submit shareholder resolutions is by convincing some of the pension fund members to bundle their 
shares they own at a targeted Swiss company (i.e. not only the shares at the Swiss companies that 
these pension funds had invested via Ethos, but also the shares that these pension funds had 
invested via other investment vehicles) and to submit shareholder resolutions together. In other 
words, in order to sponsor shareholder resolutions Ethos drew on the close relationships it had 
previously built with its pension fund members. On the basis of these relationships, Ethos managed 
to convince pension funds to put their weight behind the shareholder resolutions it formulated. And 
when Ethos has submitted resolutions, they have often proven important in changing discussions 
around specific ESG-issues in Switzerland.  
Overall, these developments indicate that Ethos was successful in mobilizing a critical mass of 
Swiss pension funds as core allies for its initiatives. Ethos thus managed to leverage its potential as a 
free space to effectively become the central nexus for Swiss pension funds’ shareholder activist 
endeavors.  
 
Stage 3: Mobilize Distant Allies 
 Ethos succeeded where others had failed before it: mobilizing the weight of Swiss pension 
funds and channel this weight to engage Swiss companies in a moralizing discussion around their 
ESG-performance. At the same time, Ethos remains a relatively small structure. Not all Swiss pension 
funds have adhered to it – some pension funds are less motivated to further goals related to 
sustainable development and remain uniquely interested in the financial performance of their 
investments. And while representing more or less 5% of the votes at the general assemblies of Swiss 
companies is certainly a respectful number, if the influence of Ethos had remained limited to these 
5%, the foundation is unlikely to have had the impact it ended up having on the Swiss economy. An 
important factor to explain Ethos’ success thus was the foundation’s ability to reach beyond its core 
                                                             
6 Contrary to the United States, where the threshold of 2000 US dollars to submit a shareholder resolution 
applies to all companies, the threshold at Swiss companies is determined by the stipulations in the corporate 
bylaws (within some minimal requirements mandated by Swiss law). Thresholds to submit shareholder 
resolutions at Swiss firms thus differ from firm to firm. 
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constituency of ESG-sensitive Swiss pension funds and to mobilize also more distant allies on select 
issues.  
Key to Ethos’ ability to do so is the continuous trend towards a more internationalized 
shareholder structure at Swiss firms since the end of the 1980s (Mach, Schnyder, David, & Lupold, 
2007). Until the end of the 1980s, the majority of Swiss firms had explicit provisions in their bylaws 
to forbid foreigners the acquisition of shares with voting rights. This changed with Nestlé’s 1988 
general assembly, at which the company decided to open its shareholder structure to foreign 
investors. Soon, all major firms in Switzerland emulated Nestlé’s move and the percentage of foreign 
– mostly American – shareholders in Swiss firms rapidly increased, such that by the beginning of the 
2000s in many of the largest Swiss firms the majority of the shareholders were non-Swiss. Seeing the 
reluctance of most Swiss shareholders to engage more actively with corporate management, Ethos 
focused on these foreign investors to gain additional allies. As Biedermann said in an interview with 
the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in 2010: 
To put it bluntly, the majority of Swiss companies is owned by foreign shareholders. […] [W]e have more and 
more contacts with foreign pension funds, not only in Europe, but also in North America or Australia. There are 
very strong links in this world of institutional investors, which are in their majority investors with a long-term 
horizon. 
Ethos’ attempts at gaining the support from international allies was greatly facilitated by the 
fact that a transnational investor infrastructure has developed over the past two decades that allows 
for bundling and coordinating activities of investors across borders with respect to voting at general 
assemblies. It is true that these transnational linkages are limited to relatively less time-consuming 
activities, such as voting at general assemblies. Activist activities that are more costly and/or time-
consuming – such as the type of dialogue Ethos conducts with companies in the EEP – are usually 
more difficult to coordinate across borders and most minority shareholders only actively engage in 
discussions with corporate management in their home markets (Jacoby, 2007). Yet, the fact that 
such transnational linkages exist for voting at general assemblies is enough to bring in the weight of 
foreign investors when Ethos sponsors shareholder resolutions at Swiss companies. There are three 
ways in which Ethos campaigns for support from international investors when it sponsors 
shareholder resolutions. 
First, it courts the large international proxy advisory firms. For simple risk management 
purposes, most institutional investors have a diversified investment portfolio investing in hundreds, 
if not thousands of firms around the world. Analyzing and determining how to vote at the general 
assembly of each one of these firms would be very costly. To determine how to vote at general 
assemblies, investors thus rely heavily on the recommendations of the large proxy advisory firms. 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, both of which cover since the beginning of 
the 2000s most important financial markets, dominate this proxy advisory market (Sauerwald, van 
Oosterhout, Van Essen, & Peng, 2016). Since the beginning of the 2000s it is estimated that these 
proxy advisory firms can bundle between 20-40% of the votes at the general assemblies of the 
largest Swiss firms. They thus wield enormous influence over the outcomes of the votes cast at these 
general assemblies and are therefore an important potential ally for minority shareholders 
submitting shareholder resolutions. When Ethos sponsors a shareholder resolution, it tries actively 
to get the backing of these proxy advisory firms by getting in direct contact with them, explaining 
their resolution and the rationale for why the proxy advisors ought to issue a supportive 
recommendation for it.  
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Second, Ethos enters in direct contact with other institutional investors. Traditionally, it was very 
difficult to find out who other shareholders of a company are. But the United Nations-supported 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), an international network of investors, has set up the 
Collaboration Platform (formerly called Clearinghouse Platform) in 2006 and Ethos became a 
signatory of PRI that same year. Investors can post their proposals on this platform and thereby 
reach out to other investors that are members of PRI. Each time Ethos sponsored a shareholder 
resolution after 2006, it campaigned for support via this platform and found this to be a very 
important and successful tool to gain traction for its proposals. 
Finally, Ethos has also invited international investors to announce publicly their support to Ethos’ 
shareholder resolutions. This element has two effects. On the one hand, it has the potential to 
galvanize other investors that have not decided whether they want to support Ethos’ resolution. On 
the other hand, it is a strong signal to the targeted companies that there will be considerable 
support for Ethos’ resolution at their upcoming general assembly.  In some instances, this signal was 
enough for companies to give in to Ethos’ demand, which then resulted in Ethos’ withdrawal of the 
shareholder resolution.  
The international support Ethos has been able to attract for its shareholder resolutions have 
allowed the foundation to punch way above its weight vis-à-vis corporate management. As 
mentioned earlier, Ethos directly holds about 0.1% of the total market capitalization of Swiss 
companies. With the backing of its core constituency – essentially composed of Swiss pension funds 
–, it may come to represent up to 5% of the votes at the general assembly of a Swiss firm. However, 
with the backing of international allies, it has repeatedly reached between 30% and 40% of the votes 
in support of the shareholder resolutions it has sponsored. From an American point of view 30% - 
40% of votes in favor of a shareholder resolution are a very respectable, but not an unusual result – 
every year there are a multitude of shareholder resolutions in the United States that reach that level 
and there are even some that get majority votes (Flammer & Bansal, 2017). But in the Swiss context, 
such a percentage of votes against corporate management is extremely rare, not only because of the 
non-conflictual local culture, but also because the management of companies traditionally coopted a 
large part of the shareholders and even had explicit provisions that limited the total amount of 
shares with voting rights that a single investor could exercise. All of these factors strongly limit the 
possibility of getting a high percentage of support for a shareholder resolution and all the stronger is 
the signal that such a high percentage of support sends to corporate management when it occurs. 
Stage 4 – Make inroads among individual firms 
Until the mid-2000s, Biedermann and Ethos enjoyed remarkable successes. Biedermann 
established Ethos as the central Swiss shareholder activist organization that managed to bundle the 
formerly dispersed power of Swiss pension funds. And it mobilized support beyond Swiss borders to 
reach impressive voting scores for its shareholder resolutions at several Swiss firms. However, these 
successes did not translate into a broader change in the behavior of corporate management, which 
largely continued to disregard minority shareholders’ concerns over ESG-issues. Based in French-
speaking Geneva, the German-speaking media were skeptical of the new actor and many Swiss 
companies found Ethos to be too aggressive and critical – in short, they engaged in discussions with 
Ethos only reluctantly and otherwise did not recognize the foundation as a natural and legitimate 
interlocutor around ESG-issues.   
The watershed moment that would lastingly change that came at the general assembly of Nestlé 
on April 14, 2005. Rainer E. Gut, Nestlé’s chairman had announced his retirement and the general 
assembly had to elect a new chairman. The board of directors proposed then-CEO Peter Brabeck to 
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succeed Gut. If approved, Brabeck would thus occupy both the position of the chairman and the 
position of the CEO – an accumulation of roles investors and corporate governance experts around 
the world view very critically because of the obvious conflict of interest the chairman has in 
controlling him-/ or herself. Ethos sought to dissuade Nestlé from proposing Brabeck before the 
general assembly but did not succeed. With the support of several Swiss pension funds, Ethos thus 
filed a series of shareholder resolutions, the most important of which demanded the separation of 
the roles of CEO and chairman at Nestlé. Ethos’ resolution received 35.9% of the votes and an 
additional 13.5% of the shareholders abstained, such that only 50.6% of shareholders were against 
Ethos’ resolution. For a variety of reasons, this result fundamentally changed the debate in 
Switzerland around the place of minority shareholders in debates around ESG-issues in Swiss 
companies. 
Hence, the fact that only 50.6% of shareholders actively supported the Nestlé management was 
unheard of in Switzerland. But Ethos had received strong support for its shareholder resolutions at 
other Swiss firms prior to the 2005 general assembly of Nestlé without the same profound 
consequences. Other factors that were specific to the situation at Nestlé in 2005 thus also played an 
important role. For instance, in terms of its business operations, Nestlé was doing very well in 2004-
2005. The support for Ethos by the shareholders could thus not be attributed to a general discontent 
of the investors with Nestlé‘s financial performance, as might have been the case with some of 
Ethos’ earlier shareholder resolutions at other firms. In addition, Nestlé occupies an outstanding role 
in the corporate landscape of Switzerland. It has been the largest Swiss company by market 
capitalization for a long time and represents close to 20% of the total market capitalization of all 
firms listed on the Swiss stock exchange. Whatever happens at Nestlé thus has a big influence on 
other Swiss firms. Additionally, Nestlé ‘sheavy-handed management of the looming confrontation 
with Ethos both before the general assembly and in its immediate aftermath generated a lot of 
publicity and negative scrutiny. For instance, Brabeck announced that the entire board of directors 
of Nestlé would step down if a majority of shareholders would support Ethos’ resolution. Not only 
had he not coordinated with the other members of the board – and several board members said in 
public that they were not planning to step down – but also was this announcement widely seen as 
an attempt at blackmailing the shareholders and at forcing them into voting in line with the board of 
directors. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (April 15, 2005), the newspaper of record for the German-
speaking part of Switzerland wrote: 
Instead of finding an arrangement in time with its shareholders, [Nestlé] got wound up in an unworthy 
attitude of defiance despite an opposition that was unexpected both in its magnitude and in its intensity. The 
embarrassing behavior further escalated in the past days with rumours of threats of resignation in case Ethos’ 
resolution would be accepted. The fact that this blackmailing affront against shareholders […] was 
subsequently denied, cannot [conceal] the mentality [behind this action]. 
The commentary by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung is remarkable because the newspaper had 
previously often been skeptical of Ethos’ activities and traditionally enjoys excellent relations with 
corporate elites in Switzerland. The scrutiny around Nestlé’s general assembly also surfaced several 
problematic aspects of corporate governance in Switzerland that exemplified the extent of 
protection many boards of directors enjoyed vis-à-vis their shareholders. Hence, a few weeks before 
Nestlé’s general assembly, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (March 5, 2005) had written : 
A problem for groups like Ethos are the giant hurdles shareholders have to overcome to exercise their 
rights. Abroad, things are different: since last year, shareholders in the United States have the right to submit a 
shareholder resolution when they own shares that are worth 2000$, in Scandinavia the possession of a single 
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share is already enough [...]. At Nestlé, however, [shareholders need] shares worth 320 million Swiss francs 
[approximately 265 million $ in April 2005]. 
Brabeck himself was weakened after the general assembly and he saw the need to engage with 
Ethos around his double role as chairman and CEO and, more generally, around issues of corporate 
governance at Nestlé. The following year, Nestlé’s general assembly approved a management-
sponsored resolution to change the corporate bylaws on several of the points Ethos had previously 
criticized. The new bylaws were accepted by the 2008 general assembly and contained several 
elements that substantially improved corporate governance at Nestlé. Also in 2008, Brabeck stepped 
down as the CEO of Nestlé and only kept his role as the chairman of the board.  
 
Stage 5 – Spread moral concern across the entire economy 
But more important than these specific corporate governance concessions was for Ethos the 
signal that Nestlé’s 2005 general assembly came to be for the general relationship between 
universal owners and the management of Swiss firms. Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the 
clash between Ethos and Nestlé the Swiss media commented on how the strong support for Ethos’ 
resolution marked a milestone in how Swiss companies are run. Serious newspapers both in the 
French and the German part of Switzerland wrote headlines, such as “Insurrection against the 
bosses” and “Shareholders, stand up!”. The image of all-powerful and untouchable corporate 
managers was shattered. It became clear that even the executives of Switzerland’s most powerful 
company were accountable to their shareholders and that the era of autocratic leadership was over. 
And although the situation was specific to Nestlé, it was clear for observers that the vote at Nestlé’s 
general assembly would have more far-reaching consequences for the Swiss economy at large. A 
commentator in the weekly magazine BILANZ (May 5, 2005) wrote:  
Rainer E. Gut and Peter Brabeck were taught a lesson that will reverberate through the Swiss economic 
landscape. From now on, shareholders are aware that they can defend themselves against inappropriate 
propositions from corporate leadership. 
And the effect of Nestlé’s general assembly was not going to remain restricted to the immediate 
aftermath of the vote. Ethos itself gained in stature and became much more publicly visible, 
especially also in the German speaking part of Switzerland. It also managed to gain endorsements 
from additional pension funds, which would in subsequent years delegate their voting rights to the 
foundation. Biedermann himself started to be referred to as a “protector of shareholders” in the 
media.  
Moreover, beyond the gained status with the media and additional pension funds, Ethos 
significantly improved its reputation among Switzerland’s corporate elites. Hence, Nestlé started 
consulting with Ethos on how to improve corporate governance at the world’s largest Food & 
Beverages company. At a personal level, Brabeck and Biedermann managed to establish a 
relationship of mutual trust. This allowed Biedermann and Ethos to spread their message among the 
corporate establishment of Switzerland and to point out that they were not revolutionaries trying to 
work against the Swiss economy, but rather that they were interested in the long-term success of 
the companies. And for Ethos, such a long-term focus does not only involve a healthy financial 
bottom line, but also a healthy corporate governance and socially and environmentally healthy 
communities within which companies operate. Brabeck and with him the Swiss corporate 
establishment started recognizing that Ethos as a long-term oriented shareholder is different from 
the short-term position many hedge funds and other institutional investors routinely take at large 
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Swiss firms. They also recognized that this long-term engagement justifies and legitimizes Ethos’ 
position as a more active – and critical –  investor and interlocutor of the management of Swiss 
companies. More than a year after the infamous Nestlé general assembly, the newspaper Der Bund 
(August 26, 2006) wrote: 
 The beginning was very difficult for Ethos. Companies lost their cool when Ethos knocked on their door 
with its questions. ‘In the first years the firms did not understand what we wanted’ says the director of Ethos. 
But when corporate leaders understand that the foundation is interested in their long-term wellbeing, they 
soften up. [...]. Today, the access to companies is much easier and there are often meetings with the highest 
echelons, with members of the board or the president.    
Ethos did not abandon its critical stance towards Swiss companies with respect to ESG-issues 
after Nestlé’s 2005 general assembly. But its relationship with the management of Swiss companies 
had fundamentally changed: it had become a legitimate interlocutor for managers in environmental, 
social and corporate governance matters and had established itself as the foremost representative 
of active ownership in Switzerland. Today, many of the ESG-issues Ethos has pushed for at Swiss 
firms have become common practice: the accumulation of the CEO and chairman functions has 
completely disappeared among Swiss blue chips, Say-on-Pay has become institutionalized, most 
Swiss firms now publish the extent of their carbon emissions (Ethos was the Swiss representative of 
the international shareholder coalition ‘Carbon Disclosure Project’) and the adoption of corporate 
codes of conduct have become widespread (Waeger & Mena, 2013). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Bringing about change and new ideas of morality to corporations and the economy is 
difficult. Novel ideas of what constitutes morally appropriate corporate conduct are often first 
pushed by moral entrepreneurs situated at the periphery of an existing moral order, such as activists 
or other secondary stakeholders (Baron, Neale, & Rao, 2016; Schifeling & Hoffman, 2017). These 
peripheral actors are less bound to the status quo and thus more likely to question it. But due to 
their peripheral position they generally lack the power and influence to lastingly anchor new 
conceptions of morality without support.  
 Based on a historical case study about the establishment of active ownership in Switzerland, 
we have developed a model for a political moralization process that accounts for how originally 
peripheral actors can end up changing prevalent conceptions of appropriate corporate behavior in 
an economy (see Figure 1). The model underlines that moral entrepreneurs’ successful mobilization 
is crucial to engage in struggles around what constitutes morally acceptable conduct with incumbent 
firms. But it also illustrates that moral entrepreneurs need to able to make inroads with their ideas 
among incumbent firms in order to lastingly change the underlying conceptions of morality in 
economic and corporate life  (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). The ultimate success of a moralization process 
thus not only hinges on the endeavors of moral entrepreneurs, but also on the receptivity of 
incumbents to the challenges mounted by these entrepreneurs.  
The case of how Ethos started from a minimal structure composed of two pension funds 
interested in pushing Swiss firms towards a better performance on environmental, social and 
corporate governance indicators has served us as an illustration of such a moralization process. In a 
first stage, dispersed Swiss pension funds needed to create a free space for mobilization, which they 
could fill in the second stage by mobilizing core allies. In a third stage, they had to reach out to more 
distant, powerful allies, which allowed them in stage four to foray into formerly resistant corporate 
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targets. These corporate targets, in turn, started to accept the pension funds as legitimate 
interlocutors on ESG-issues. The reaction of these targets then spilled over to other Swiss companies 
and led to the widespread institutionalization of active ownership.   
 Overall, the model that emerges from this case draws on various factors existing scholarship 
has singled out as playing a role in how social movements and activists can act as moral 
entrepreneurs in an economy. We took inspiration from that literature and integrated several 
factors into our model. The implication from this integration is that no one single factor can account 
for how activists have a moralizing effect on economic life. Rather, the model emphasizes the 
interdependence and sequentiality of multiple factors that jointly contribute to a moralization 
dynamic in the economy.  
 This process model being inspired by a single (and successful) case of how the economy has 
become moralized, there are naturally some specificities related to our context that may not 
universally apply. For instance, while the importance of free spaces for mobilizing challengers is a 
cornerstone of social movement research (Rao & Dutta, 2012), whether such free spaces are – as in 
our case – actively created and thus part of the mobilization process (Massa, 2017) or whether their 
existence predates mobilization (Heinze & Weber, 2016; Kellogg, 2009; Waeger & Weber, 2017) 
likely varies across settings. In general terms, while the process model points to an interdependence 
of multiple factors, there is likely variance regarding the importance of any individual factor across 
settings and some factors may be altogether unnecessary for change to happen under certain 
circumstances. For instance, it is imaginable that moral entrepreneurs are able to garner sufficient 
influence and power by mobilizing core allies and thus do not need to reach out as much to more 
distant ones as was necessary in the case under study here. 
 Another question regards the exact sequence of the different stages in the process. As 
illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 1, there is likely also a circular, rather than purely a linear 
dynamic among the different stages of the process with multiple feedback loops occurring across 
time. Hence, in our case, Ethos’ ability to make inroads among individual firms in stage 4 of the 
model allowed it to mobilize additional core allies (stage 2 in the model). At the same time, stage 4 
of the process would not have been reached had Ethos not attained a critical mass of core allies 
previously. More generally, it is at least theoretically conceivable that there is first a mobilization of 
distant allies and only afterwards a creation of a free space in the local environment, but we would 
argue that the modal sequence of the political process to moralize the economy looks more similar 
to the one we found in our case.  
It is also interesting to emphasize that at a lower level of abstraction than in Figure 1, several 
factors about the case discussed in the present article are likely quite different from other 
moralization processes set off by activists. For instance, public pressure transmitted via media 
outlets played a relatively minor role in the present context, whereas it is a crucial element of many 
other moralization processes, in which activists are involved (Schifeling & Hoffman, 2017; Vergne, 
Wernicke, & Brenner, 2018). And the centralization of activist efforts at Ethos was facilitated by the 
fact that Ethos was mobilizing pension funds, rather than individuals. In other cases, where 
successful mobilization depends on mass participation from individuals across locations, more 
decentralized activist organizations are likely to emerge, which may, in turn, interfere with 
coordinated decision making and campaigning (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004).  
Finally, the process model conveys the impression of an inevitable advancement towards the 
final stage of moralization. While this scenario has played out in the case under study in the present 
article, it is clear both logically and from the case we have described that there are important 
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challenges to be overcome at each stage of the process. Future research could look into the 
circumstances under which these obstacles are more difficult to overcome and where, therefore, the 
process may stall and never be completed (Schneiberg, 2013). For instance, incumbents are 
oftentimes opposed to changes in the status quo and it would be interesting to investigate what 
precise actions they undertake to halt the advancement of the process at each stage (Mena, 
Rintamäki, Fleming, & Spicer, 2016). Such future investigations would help refine the presented 
model and ultimately contribute to further improving our understanding of the ways through which 
activists can act as moral entrepreneurs that influence the conceptions of morally appropriate 
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